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Abstract
This paper proposes an approach to the philosophy of mathematics,
deductive pluralism, that satisfies the criterion of inclusiveness of math-
ematical practice. The basic argument is as follows: there are existing
varieties of mathematics with incompatible foundations; given these va-
rieties, a philosophy of mathematics should be inclusive; the criterion of
inclusiveness and the fact of incompatible varieties implies a pluralistic
philosophy; this in turn requires a deductivist approach within each va-
riety; thus deductive pluralism. The advantages of deductive pluralism
include the elimination of ontological problems, epistemological clarity,
and objectivity.
1 Introduction
The basic argument of this paper is: there are existing varieties of mathematics
with incompatible foundations, mathematical or logical; given these varieties,
a philosophy of mathematics should be inclusive, i.e., not reject a variety as
false in some absolute sense, and include existing and future varieties; the crite-
rion of inclusiveness and the fact of incompatible varieties requires a pluralistic
philosophy; this in turn requires within each variety a deductivist approach in
which mathematical results explicitly or implicitly take the form of implications
that the assumptions imply the conclusions after a long development from the
foundations of definitions, theorems, and examples; thus deductive pluralism.
This section will introduce the concept of a variety of mathematics and related
concepts used in the rest of the paper. Section 2 considers factors that have
motivated deductive pluralism. Section 3 discusses a few varieties of mathemat-
ics that are distinguished by incompatible mathematical or logical foundations,
discussing their motivations, formalized mathematical and logical foundations,
and highlighting some of their incompatibilities. The most widely used of these
is standard mathematics, which has Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the ax-
iom of choice (ZFC) as the mathematical foundation and first order predicate
calculus (FOPC) as the logical foundation. Section 4 discusses in more de-
tail the criterion of inclusiveness and the components of deductive pluralism in
light of the examples. Section 5 places deductive pluralism in the philosophy
of mathematics by discussing its ontology, epistemology, and objectivity. Sec-
tion 6 considers and answers some possible criticisms of deductive pluralism,
including its consistency with mathematical practice and with the attitudes of
philosophers and mathematicians who consider foundational questions. Section
7 considers other forms of pluralism, and finally section 8 considers deductive
pluralism as it relates to some other philosophies of mathematics. Since logi-
cal assumptions are part of a foundation for a variety there is an appendix on
relevant logical concepts which may be referred to as needed. There is also an
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appendix giving some examples of the historical development of mathematics
towards an axiomatic (thus deductive) viewpoint.
As used in this paper, a variety of mathematics consists of the logical and
mathematical foundations and the results (which in this paper include defini-
tions, examples, and theorems) developed from the foundations. A variety will
usually be considered as containing the maximal set of results (reflecting “the
unity of mathematics”), although sometimes it may be useful to consider an
axiomatized theory such as Dedekind-Peano arithmetic (PA) as a stand-alone
variety as well as a theory within standard mathematics.
Varieties of interest are eventually formalized, and so it is useful to con-
sider two aspects of the foundations of, and theories within, such a variety: its
formal, axiomatized, and uninterpreted symbols (the syntax) and its interpre-
tations (the semantics). The symbols can be divided into variable, logical, and
relational symbols (constants, etc.), which are used to express the axioms. As-
sociated with a formal system is a formal proof which is one that can be verified
mechanically, such as by a computer proof assistant, examples of which will
be introduced below. A deduction within a variety is seldom fully formalized
but is usually rigorous, or sometimes still less formal. The concept of rigor is
necessarily imprecise since it will vary between mathematicians, between areas
of mathematics, and in different historical periods; however, in this paper a
rigorous proof will be one that can in principle be formalized.
An interpretation assigns the symbols of a formal system to elements of
another system used as a reference, and if the axioms of a theory hold in an
interpretation then the interpretation is called a model. As a simple example
with no non-logical axioms, consider propositional logic as the formal system
with the interpretation in a set U. The variables correspond to subsets of U
and the logical operations of conjunction, disjunction, and negation correspond
respectively to the set operations of intersection, union, and complementation
in U. Since the axioms of propositional calculus hold in this interpretation, it
is a model. A formalism will usually have a particular intended interpretation
reflecting its motivation, as is seen in the examples of section 3. There are advan-
tages to viewing the foundations and theories as formal uninterpreted symbols
with formal proofs. One advantage is the reduction of error since historically
a common source of error has been the use of non-formal, imprecisely defined
concepts, or proofs that rely on implicit assumptions that do not follow from the
explicit assumptions. The desire to avoid such errors was a major motivation
for univalent foundations discussed below. Another advantage is the possibil-
ity of multiple interpretations and thus multiple applications of the formalism
since a formal proof applies to all interpretations. The formalism reflects the
development over time of a variety, including abstraction and generalization
from motivating examples, consideration of possible axioms, and new examples
sometimes leading to new or modified axioms.
The varieties of mathematics may have different and incompatible logics used
to derive conclusions from the foundational mathematical assumptions. Thus,
an inclusive criterion for varieties of mathematics also requires an inclusive view
of logics, at least for those used in mathematics. There are many varieties of
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logic, with different attitudes towards them. A type of pluralistic attitude has
been advocated by Shapiro, who wrote: “Pluralism about a given subject, such
as truth, logic, ethics, or etiquette, is the view that different accounts of the
subject are equally correct, or equally good, or equally legitimate, or perhaps
even true”(Shapiro, 2014, p. 13). This paper also has a pluralistic attitude;
however whether two logics are “equally good” depends on the objectives and
motivations. For example intuitionistic logic has been considered as part and
parcel of constructive mathematics (as discussed in Section 3.4), thus FOPC
is not as “good” as intuitionistic logic for constructivism. Other examples and
their motivations are quantum logic, which denies the distributivity of con-
junction over disjunction, and reflects Heisenberg uncertainty for incompatible
observables such as position and momentum, and linear logic which reflects a
resource-consciousness in which formulas represent resources which cannot be
used without limit, as in computer logic gates. Thus, it is possible to view
logics as tools whose suitability depends on the task, with First Order Predi-
cate Calculus viewed as a general purpose (but not necessarily all-purpose) tool
reflecting commonly accepted reasoning. The focus in this paper is on the im-
plications for the philosophy of mathematics given the criterion of inclusiveness
and the existing varieties of mathematics with incompatible foundations, exem-
plified in Section 3. The logics (and possible future logics) vary greatly so there
is no useful overarching logic that can be applied within all the varieties. Thus,
in this paper when considering varieties of mathematics, the mathematical and
logical assumptions of varieties will be compared and then results within those
varieties obtained by applying the logics of those varieties will be compared.
Since the objective of considering the varieties is to show the incompatibilities,
little beyond comparison will be needed. If deductions are needed outside a
variety, during the discussion, then the general purpose logical tool of FOPC
will be used.
2 Motivating Considerations
The first motivation concerns the status of consistency. A system is inconsis-
tent if a contradiction can be derived. Inconsistency can be proven by exhibiting
such a derivation, as Russell did with Frege’s system. In principle if a system
is inconsistent then this can demonstrated by systematically listing all possible
derivations; however, such a process will not terminate if the system is consis-
tent. Thus, the problem lies in demonstrating that there can be no derivation
of a contradiction. But this has become problematic for systems containing
arithmetic, beginning with Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem which im-
plies that a consistent first order formal system using FOPC as the logic and
containing PA, such as standard mathematics, cannot prove its own consistency.
Thus, for such systems, although consistency is not relative, depending only on
the mathematical and logical assumptions, results asserting consistency are rel-
ative: such results state that if one system is consistent then so is another. A
philosophy of mathematics should take onboard the relative nature of results
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asserting consistency.
The second motivation comes from the problematic nature, pointed out in
philosophical discussions, of the existence of abstract objects (those not existing
in spacetime) such as mathematical objects. There has been no philosophical
agreement on even the meaningfulness of the question; for example, Balaguer
(1998, 22) considered the question as essentially meaningless when he wrote
that the existence of abstract objects “does not have any truth condition.” One
of the clearest approaches to abstract objects within mathematics is that of
Hilbert (1902, 9–10) who equated the existence of such objects with consistency
in his 1900 address introducing the Hilbert Problems. This 1900 suggestion
has become problematic due to discoveries since then. First, as noted in the
preceding paragraph, results asserting consistency have become relative. Thus,
consistency (or existence using Hilbert’s criterion) cannot be proven, so it must
be assumed. This is essentially a deductivist position: statements assert what
follows from the assumptions. A related problem is the multiplicity of contra-
dictory but relatively consistent axiom systems, so that if existence is identified
with consistency then there are contradictory assertions, including some based
on standard mathematics. For example, consider the Continuum Hypothesis
(CH), which states that any infinite subset of the reals must have the same cardi-
nality as (be equinumerous with) either the reals or the natural numbers. If ZFC
(using FOPC) is assumed to be a consistent basis for mathematics, then both
ZFC+CH and ZFC+¬CH are also consistent (by the work of Go¨del and Cohen).
So, using consistency as the criterion for existence, if the existential assertions
of ZFC hold then so do the contradictory assertions of CH and ¬CH. (Note the
difference between this contradiction within one theory—the real numbers—and
two distinct theories with incompatible assumptions that have examples within
standard mathematics—e.g., Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry.) Thus,
the initially attractive idea of identifying mathematical existence with consis-
tency runs aground on the results since the 1900 formulation, and so assertions
of the absolute existence of mathematical abstracta are problematic and should
be avoided.
The third motivation comes from noting that there are incompatible varieties
of mathematics, with some examples given in the next section. Although some
variety may be preferred for reasons such as philosophy, tradition, simplicity, or
applicability, the question is: can the others be viewed as false in some absolute
sense? If so, on what basis, particularly in light of the relative nature of results
asserting consistency in mathematics which removes absolute consistency as a
criterion?
3 Varieties of Mathematics
This section gives examples of varieties of mathematics focusing on factors
needed in later sections, primarily incompatible assumptions or results, but also
their motivations and formalizations. Only a few varieties are discussed below
due to space limitations, with the selection based on considerations such as their
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comparability to standard mathematics, their prominence within mathematics,
recent interest, or foundations based on something other than set theory. While
working within a variety, the logic of that variety is applied to the previous re-
sults, ultimately to the foundational assumptions, to deduce theorems, to make
definitions, or to construct examples.
3.1 Standard Mathematics
The first example of a variety of mathematics will be standard mathematics
(ZFC with FOPC as the logic). Most mathematics as practiced, both pure and
applied, is standard mathematics. Since it is so dominant and extensive most
other varieties of mathematics, including those discussed below, are careful to
include many of the same or similar theories and results as standard mathemat-
ics (e.g., PA as interpreted within the variety). The motivations for the ZFC
formalization include: the desire to answer the set-theoretic paradoxes while
providing a foundation for mathematical practice; to fortify the position of the
axiom of choice; and to support Hilbert’s program of axiomatization (see section
2.9.1 “Motivations” in Ebbinghaus and Peckhaus (2007)).
In standard mathematics model theory studies these interpretations within
set theory. However, the interpretation need not be in set theory, and need not
be unique. For example, consider ZF–Inf: the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms with
the axiom of infinity negated. The intended interpretation is the collection of
hereditarily finite sets, which is defined inductively by starting with the empty
set and then taking only finite collections of other hereditarily finite sets: if
S1, S2, ..., Sk are hereditarily finite then so is the set {S1, S2, ..., Sk}. Ackermann
(1937) gave a non-standard interpretation of ZF–Inf in the natural numbers by
interpreting the variables as natural numbers and m ∈ n satisfies the binary
relation symbol “∈” (where same “∈” symbol is used in both the syntactic and
semantic systems when there is no danger of confusion) if and only if the mth
digit in the binary representation of n is 1, counting the digits from the right
and starting at the 0th. Thus, m ∈ n if 2m is in the binary expansion of n.
For example 22 = 24 + 22 + 21 so 1 ∈ 22, 2 ∈ 22 and 4 ∈ 22. The Ackermann
interpretation, which is consistent relative to PA, is an example of a common
situation: the syntactic system does not uniquely determine the semantic system
so that there are other interpretations in addition to the intended interpretation.
Note that a fully formal proof of a theorem (possibly verified by a computer proof
assistant as discussed below) does not use the interpretation, and thus such a
theorem holds in all interpretations.
3.2 Nonstandard Mathematics
Our next example, nonstandard analysis, is an extension of standard math-
ematics that was motivated by the desire to put infinitesimals on a rigorous
foundation, and was developed by Abraham Robinson. The logic is the same
as in standard mathematics, and there are many approaches to developing the
infinitesimals. Nonstandard analysis is a conservative extension of standard
5
mathematics in that any proposition stated in the language of standard mathe-
matics that can be proven using nonstandard analysis can also be proven using
standard mathematics. An example of this is the nonstandard proof by Bern-
stein and Robinson (1966) that every polynomially compact operator has a
non-trivial invariant subspace, which appeared back-to-back with a standard
proof. In their article they wrote that “[t]he proof is within the framework of
Nonstandard Analysis” (Bernstein and Robinson, 1966, p 421), which illustrates
that when a variety of mathematics other than standard mathematics is used
the foundations are made explicit, especially if the work is in a journal contain-
ing standard mathematics in which standard foundations would otherwise be
implicitly assumed.
3.3 Tarski-Grothendieck Set Theory
Tarski-Grothendieck set theory (TG), is an example of a non-conservative ex-
tension of ZFC with FOPC as the logic. TG set theory adds an axiom U to
ZFC stating that every set is an element of a Grothendieck universe, where a
Grothendieck universe is a set in TG that acts like a realization of the class of
all ZFC sets, and so exists in TG but not in ZFC. A motivation is to provide
a basis for the work of Grothendieck and others in algebraic geometry by clar-
ifying and simplifying assumptions, although it is widely believed that most of
the results using TG can also be obtained within ZFC alone, and thus avoid the
risk of the additional assumption of U producing a contradiction. For example,
the Stack Project (http://stacks.math.columbia.edu) has as one of its aims to
avoid universes by using “partial universes”, i.e., sufficiently large sets that vary
with the context. Finally, TG has been formalized using the Mizar computer
proof assistant (http://www.mizar.org).
3.4 Constructive Mathematics
Constructive mathematics was motivated by the philosophical criterion that
mathematical objects should be constructible in some sense. The version con-
sidered here, sometimes referred to as BISH, was developed from the work of
Errett Bishop. BISH is an example of a variety of mathematics in which the
mathematical assertions and logic have both rules and intended interpretations
different from standard mathematics. For example, in BISH if P and Q are
propositions then P −→ Q can be asserted only when a given construction for
P can be constructively transformed into a construction for Q. Also, if P is
a proposition then P ∨ ¬P can be asserted only when there is a constructive
method of asserting P or a constructive method of asserting ¬P , which is not
always possible, so the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) does not hold in general.
The logical foundation is intuitionistic logic, which is FOPC without LEM (also
see intuitionistic logic in the appendix), and the mathematical foundations can
be formalized as intuitionistic set theory. Standard mathematics is a proper
extension of BISH, so that all theorems of BISH are also theorems of standard
mathematics, but not conversely. Standard mathematics can also be viewed
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as an extension of PA. However, the situations differ: standard mathematics
does not contradict the motivations or logic of PA, but does contradict the mo-
tivations of BISH since, for example, standard mathematics accepts LEM but
BISH rejects LEM. Also, Bridges and Palmgren (2016) give as an example the
comb (or Dirichlet), function (defined on the unit interval so that it is 1 on the
rational numbers and 0 on the irrational numbers in the interval) which exists
in standard mathematics but not in BISH.
3.5 Univalent Foundations
The univalent foundations program (http://homotopytypetheory.org), is a re-
cent development with a motivation stated in the subtitle “A Personal Mission
to Develop Computer Proof Verification to Avoid Mathematical Mistakes” of
the paper by Voevodsky (2014, 8), and which is proposed as a “viable alternative
to set theory.” To do this the program is formalized using the computer proof
assistant Coq (http://coq.inria.fr), which is used not only to check proofs but
to develop them. Thus, univalent foundations explicitly addresses the question
of the reliability of proofs discussed below in section 5. The intended interpre-
tation is homotopy theory, and is an example of a variety of mathematics not
based on set theory. Instead, it has as its basis an extension of the predicative,
intuitionistic Martin-Lo¨f type theory, with additional axioms such as univalence.
The univalence axiom in implies that isomorphic structures can be identified.
Identifying structures up to isomorphism is common in standard mathematics;
however, isomorphic objects are not always identified. For example, the single-
ton sets {0} and {1} are isomorphic as sets (and by a unique isomorphism) but
if they are identified then by extensionality the elements would be the same and
so as a consequence 0 = 1. Thus, univalent foundations are incompatible with
standard set theory.
3.6 Category Theory
There have been proposals that some variety of category theory (CT) be a foun-
dation for mathematics as an alternative to set theory. This approach is similar
to univalent foundations in that the primary objective is usually a different
foundation rather than a substantially different mathematics. It is also similar
in that categorical foundations use topoi, which are a generalization of sets and
whose logic is, in general, intuitionistic logic. Linnebo and Pettigrew (2011)
survey some possibilities for using category theory as a foundation with some
criteria, e.g., requiring independence from set theory and requiring some exis-
tential assertions (as ZFC asserts the existence of the empty set). Some theories
are rejected: Synthetic Differential Geometry (SDG) as too narrow and the Cat-
egory of Categories As Foundations (CCAF) as not independent of set theory.
They then consider the Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets (ETCS) as
a case study. ETCS is significantly different from set theory. In it everything
is defined in terms of (category theoretic) arrows which presents problems for
set membership since in this approach an element cannot be a member of more
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than one set, extensionality does not hold, and there are multiple (isomorphic)
empty sets. In addition, although ETCS may be logically independent of set
theory, it requires prior set theory for interpretations, for examples, and thus
for comprehension.
3.7 Inconsistent Mathematics
Inconsistent mathematics is mathematics in which some contradictions are al-
lowed (Mortensen, 1995). If a contradiction implies all statements then the
system is trivial, thus the logic used cannot be standard logic. The most com-
mon alternative is some kind of relevant logic. Most of the work in this area has
been in the logical foundations and their immediate consequences, although sug-
gestions have been made for other possible applications including inconsistent
databases, inconsistent pictures (such as those by Escher), earlier mathemat-
ics (such as infinitesimals), alternative accounts of the differentiability of delta
functions, or solutions of inconsistent sets of equations. Inconsistent set theory
is one of the most widely studied topics within inconsistent mathematics. The
objective is often to have a set theory based on two assumptions: unrestricted
comprehension (for any predicate P , ∃z∀x(x ∈ z ↔ P (x))) and extensionality
(y = z ↔ ∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ z)). As is well known the former leads to Rus-
sell’s paradox by setting P (x) = (x /∈ x), and so to avoid triviality, in which
all predicates hold, a non-explosive logic must be used. Also see the section on
paraconsistent logic.
In this section we have briefly examined several varieties of mathematics.
The list is not meant to be exhaustive: some varieties not discussed are vari-
ous versions of finitism. However, the above varieties should be enough for the
following discussion. If a philosophy of mathematics is to be inclusive of mathe-
matical practice then it must accommodate these varieties, which have different
logical assumptions (e.g., FOPC or intuitionistic), different set theoretic foun-
dations (e.g., ZFC or ZFCU) or foundations not using set theory (e.g., univalent
foundations). As a consequence objects, such as the Dirichlet comb function of
section 3.4, may exist in one variety of mathematics but not in another vari-
ety. Thus, the discussions of the above varieties show that no single logical or
mathematical foundation is feasible. Given this, the simplest and most natu-
ral approach within a variety is deductivism, as proposed in the introduction.
The following sections expand on deductive pluralism, discuss the philosophi-
cal advantages of deductive pluralism, consider and answer possible arguments
against deductive pluralism, and finally consider some related philosophies of
mathematics.
4 The Components of Deductive Pluralism
The components of deductive pluralism are the requirement of inclusiveness, its
consequence of pluralism, and the necessity of deductivism (sometimes referred
to as if-thenism) within a variety. This section will discuss and justify these
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components.
There are two elements of inclusiveness as used in this paper. The first is
that no variety should be ruled out of consideration by viewing it as false in some
absolute sense, unless, of course, a fatal error is found. But what if a variety is
shown to be inconsistent, i.e., a contradiction is derived? Is this a fatal error?
FOPC allows all statements to be derived from a contradiction; thus a system
that contains contradictions must use a logic that prevents this, such as relevant
logic, if triviality (all propositions hold) is to be avoided. And indeed there is
research into inconsistent mathematics with a continuing body of publications.
So, deductive pluralism will not rule out varieties that allow some contradictions.
From within a variety, i.e., relative to that variety, some statements in another
variety may be viewed as false. For example, from the viewpoint of constructive
mathematics LEM (as a general principle) is viewed as false. The primary
problem with considering a variety as false in an absolute sense is the lack of
generally acceptable and principled criteria for such a decision. This lack is
shown by the support given by respected mathematicians such as Bishop to
constructive mathematics, Grothendieck to TG, and Voevodsky to univalent
foundations. Nevertheless, some mathematicians or philosophers may view a
variety as false in an absolute sense (e.g., Hauser and Woodin (2014) discussed
below), and such a rejection may be itself unfalsifiable. In particular, recall
the earlier discussion in section 2 on the lack of generally accepted criteria for
the existence of abstract objects, including Hilbert’s 1900 proposal to identify
existence with consistency. This lack of criteria has two effects: it makes it
difficult to falsify claims, but it also argues in favor of an inclusive view to avoid
rejecting a variety for insufficient reasons. Thus, the criterion of inclusiveness
is well justified.
The second component of inclusiveness is that a philosophy should apply to
existing (and future) varieties. For example, there may be a philosophy solely
concerned with constructive mathematics. This would be fine as far as it goes,
but would be a partial philosophy of mathematics and thus not satisfy this
paper’s criterion of inclusiveness. Based on these considerations an inclusive
philosophy is one that does not view the foundations or results of a variety as
false in an absolute sense, and that is not a partial philosophy.
A pluralistic philosophy of mathematics should be combined with a deduc-
tive approach within a variety. By this is meant that a mathematical assertion
implicitly or explicitly states that a conclusion follows from assumptions, ulti-
mately from the logical and mathematical foundations after a long development
of intermediate results–or, as a motto, mathematics studies what follows from
what within a variety. In deductivism the foundational assumptions are not con-
sidered true in some absolute sense, but as a basis for work within the variety.
For example, foundational assumptions in set theory may include the existence
of an empty set and the existence of an infinite set. Additional set theoretic
assumptions will assert that if some sets exist then others exist. A deductivist
approach will not assert that the empty set exists or that an infinite set exists
in some absolute sense (a problematic question for abstract objects) but rather
will ask what conclusions can be drawn from such assumptions.
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If, contrary to deductivism, some foundational assumptions of a variety are
considered as true in some absolute sense then contradictory assumptions would
be viewed as false. A philosophy that viewed foundational assumptions of a vari-
ety as false would likely reject that variety, violating the inclusiveness criterion.
Thus, results within a variety should be viewed as holding or not relative to the
foundational assumptions of that variety and the question becomes whether the
results are correctly deduced from the assumptions: a deductive stance.
We should also note what deductive pluralism does not assert. Deduc-
tive pluralism, as advocated here, does not imply that formal foundations are
unmotivated—some kind of game with symbols. Although in principle a set
of axioms could have little motivation or be essentially random, such a system
would be of little interest. Historically, as with the examples of section 3, a va-
riety and its formalization has been motivated by considerations such as histor-
ical traditions, questions internal to mathematics or logic, scientific problems,
applications, or philosophical concerns. These motivations may also supply
the intended interpretation. Deductive pluralism is not a version of fictional-
ism (which views mathematical assertions as false) since in deductive pluralism
mathematical results, implicitly or explicitly, take the form of assertions that
the assumptions imply the conclusions. With this approach the assertions (i.e.,
implications) are also objectively true in that mathematicians favoring different
varieties of mathematics can agree that given the assumptions, the logic to be
used, and a deduction correctly using this logic then the conclusion follows. Fi-
nally, deductive pluralism need not be viewed as a version of nominalism (which
denies the existence of abstracta) since it regards the question of the existence
of abstract (mathematical) objects as indeterminate in the absence of generally
acceptable criteria for their existence, as discussed in section 2.
5 Deductive Pluralism as a Philosophy of Math-
ematics
This section will discuss considerations which are relevant to any philosophy of
mathematics: ontology, epistemology, and objectivity. One of the advantages
of any version of deductivism is the elimination of ontological problems since
no variety is considered as true in some absolute sense, and the statements are
assertions that the assumptions imply the conclusions. This is similar to the
view expressed by Carnap (1950) that the “reality” of abstract entities can only
be considered within a linguistic framework. In practice a result will appear in
a context in which many of the assumptions are implicitly understood, and the
deductions will be from previous results and not from the foundations.
Any attempt to go beyond deductivism requires confronting the problematic
question of the existence of abstract objects. There are many views, some of
which consider the question as essentially meaningless, such as Balaguer’s cited
in section 2. In the context of mathematics, an ontological question arises about
the universe of sets. If a universe of sets exists in an absolute sense, is it the
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universe of ZFC?, or TG?, or the intuitionistic set theory of BISH?, or perhaps
some other? How can this be determined? Also, as pointed out in section
2, the 1900 suggestion by Hilbert identifying existence in mathematics with
consistency ran afoul of discoveries since his proposal.
The question of epistemology for deductive pluralism centers on the consis-
tency of the foundations (except for inconsistent mathematics noted above) and
on the reliability of the proofs of the theorems. Since standard mathematics
cannot prove its own consistency, most mathematicians implicitly assume con-
sistency; but some do question the foundations and seek inconsistencies. For
example in 2011 a respected mathematician, Edward Nelson, posted a claim
that he had found a contradiction within the Dedekind-Peano axioms, but an
error in his reasoning was soon located and the claim was withdrawn (Nelson
(2015)). The failures of these explicit efforts and the long development without
finding contradictions give some support to the assumption that the standard
foundations are consistent. If a contradiction were found then a likely result
would be a modified set of axioms that avoids the contradiction and preserves
(almost all) mathematics, as occurred with the discovery of Russell’s paradox.
Are the theorems reliable given the foundations? The theorems are usually
supported by rigorous, but not fully formalized, proofs. There can be consider-
able disagreement on when a published proof has sufficient detail, but, as dis-
cussed above, a common idea is that it should be possible to expand a published
proof to obtain a formal proof, e.g., one which can be checked by a computer
proof assistant. According to Mackenzie (2001, 323) mechanization of proofs in
the mathematical literature has supported the belief that these rigorous proofs
are reliable:
Research for this book has been unable to find a case in which the
application of mechanized proof threw doubt upon an established
mathematical theorem, and only one case in which it showed the
need significantly to modify an accepted rigorous-argument proof.
This is testimony to the robustness of ‘social processes’ within math-
ematics.
Nothing is perfect and there are errors in published proofs which may lie unde-
tected for many years, especially in those which are seldom examined. However,
mechanical checking, as with Coq (used with univalent foundations) or Mizar
(used with TG set theory with results in the Journal of Formalized Mathemat-
ics), reduces the chance for error and provides a robust check on mathematics.
In deductive pluralism mathematical results, implicitly or explicitly, take
the form of assertions that the assumptions imply the conclusions. With this
approach the assertions (i.e., implications) are also objectively true in that math-
ematicians favoring different varieties of mathematics can agree that given the
mathematical assumptions, the logic to be used, and a deduction correctly using
this logic, then the conclusion follows.
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6 Possible Objections
This section will consider and answer some possible objections to deductive plu-
ralism. The objections will be roughly organized into several categories: first
objections that may apply to some versions of deductivism (or if-thenism) but
not to deductive pluralism, then objections based on absolute views, on appli-
cations, and finally those based on mathematical practice. As examples of the
first category, Maddy (1989, 1124) defines if-thenism as the “study of logical
consequence.” This is similar to deductivism as discussed in this paper, but
there are possible differences: based on the remarks below, there seems to be
an implicit assumption tying it to one variety of mathematics rather than the
pluralist approach advocated in this paper. For example, Maddy considered
it a “petty embarrassment” to if-thenism that an assertion about the integers,
such as “2+2=4”, could follow from several foundations. This concern does not
apply to deductive pluralism which explicitly acknowledges and accepts plural-
ism, and as we wrote in section 3 most varieties of mathematics are careful to
include many of the same or similar theories and results as standard mathe-
matics, including arithmetic. Maddy (1989, 1124) then wrote in discussing the
Continuum Hypothesis that
if we move to the idea of second order consequence, the Continuum
Hypothesis becomes a real question in its own right, in the sense that
it either follows or doesn’t follow from second order ZF. But CH is
just the sort of question If-thenism hopes to count as meaningless.
Again, this objection seems to be based on an implicit assumption of a single
variety of if-thenism. But this does not apply to deductive pluralism, which does
not restrict the logical component to first order logic, and allows varieties using
FOPC that decide CH. For example, let V=L be the axiom of constructability
which states that all sets (V) are constructible sets (L). Then ZF+(V=L) im-
plies CH (using FOPC), as well as implying ZFC. So, from the point of view of
deductive pluralism CH is not meaningless, but is indeterminate in some vari-
eties of mathematics but not in others. Thus, when considering an objection to
some form of deductivism (if-thenism) it needs to be ascertained if the objection
also applies to deductive pluralism as advocated here.
6.1 Objections Based on Absolute Views
There are assertions that some statements about the natural numbers (starting
from 1 rather than 0) are unquestionably true in an absolute sense. Some ex-
amples of these are: “there is one prime between 15 and 18” (concerning small
natural numbers); “2+3 = 5” (concerning arithmetic of small natural numbers);
or even “there are infinitely many primes” (concerning the (potential) infinity of
the natural numbers). Since these statements are made with little or no discus-
sion of the implicit assumptions (and there are always assumptions—“nothing
comes from nothing”) about the meaning of the terms and about the nature
of the natural numbers, the following comments are somewhat tentative. For
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writers with this view concepts about the natural numbers have an intuitive,
or indeed “natural”, and inevitable status. However, not all societies have such
concepts. For example, according to Frank et al. (2008) the Piraha˜ of Amazonia
have no number words but can do one-to-one matching tasks when these tasks
do not require memory. This requires matching discrete and persistent objects,
perhaps with canonical collections, such as fingers. For example, if disjoint col-
lections of 2 and 3 discrete, persistent objects are matched with 2 and 3 fingers,
then the total collection is matched with 5 fingers. Thus, natural numbers are
not so natural, arising in some, but not all, societies possibly from experience in
matching collections of discrete and persistent objects. Or, in brief, matching
is natural, not numbers.
Some criticisms are based on the view that a particular foundation is true or
false in an absolute sense rather than in a relative sense, in which a sentence is
true within a variety if it follows from the assumptions of that variety using that
variety’s logic. Mathematicians are almost always working within the context of
a variety of mathematics, usually standard mathematics. Within such a context
if asked whether a mathematical object exists or a result holds, they will answer
in the affirmative. However, if the context is broader and more philosophical,
then the attitudes may be more nuanced. Thus, in discussing such attitudes it
is necessary to try to determine the context. A similar point was made by the
mathematician Hersh (1997, 39) who wrote: “Writers agree: The working math-
ematician is a Platonist on weekdays and a formalist on Sundays.” This can be
interpreted as stating that when doing mathematics (on weekdays) within the
context and implicit assumptions of a variety a mathematician can assert exis-
tence, e.g., of the empty set, but when reflecting more broadly on mathematics
or considering foundational questions (on Sundays) a more deductivist view may
be adopted. The philosopher Papineau (1990, 161) made a similar distinction
between contexts when he wrote “mathematical practice only establishes hypo-
thetical facts about what follows from what, whereas mathematical judgements
standardly make categorical claims of existence.” Mathematicians do make im-
plicit or explicit judgements when deciding what foundational assumptions to
make, but these judgements may not be intended to assert absolute claims,
even by those advocating a new foundation. For example, Mumford (2000, 198)
suggested that statistical random variables should be a primitive concept with
stochastic set theory as a foundation for mathematics, which required either
the axiom of choice or the power set axiom to be dropped. The motivation for
this proposal was relevance to possible applications rather than absolute claims.
Similarly, the advocates of univalent foundations view it as a viable alternative
to set theory with reduced chances of errors in proofs rather than as a correction
of absolutely false foundations.
Philosophers (who may or may not support deductivism) have commented on
the attitudes of mathematicians towards foundations and deductivism. Maddy
(1989, 1223–224) generalized about the attitude of mathematicians when she
wrote:
What you hear from the mathematician intent on avoiding philoso-
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phy often sounds more like this: “All I’m doing is showing that this
follows from that. Truth has nothing to do with it. Mathematics is
just a study of what follows from what.”
Of course, from the point of view of deductive pluralism the characterization
of mathematics as studying “what follows from what” is not an avoidance of
philosophy but an assertion of a deductivist philosophy—recall the motto in
section 4: mathematics studies “what follows from what” within a variety. In
a similar vein Clarke-Doane (2013, 470) wrote that “[m]athematicians are over-
whelmingly concerned with questions of logic—questions of what follows from
what.” Thus, according to these philosophers mathematicians generally (when
considering philosophy) do not assert absolute views. Now, it is true that some
mathematicians do have attitudes that assert absolute truth claims about ab-
stract objects, especially in set theory since those studying large cardinals (“the
higher infinite”) are likely to reject or even consider as absolutely false axioms
that exclude their objects of study. For example, the axiom of constructability,
V=L, together with ZF resolves a variety of problems as noted above. However,
ZF+(V=L) is inconsistent with many of the large cardinal axioms (although it
is consistent with Grothendieck universes). Thus, Hauser and Woodin (2014,
13) wrote: “In fact the assertion V=L itself is almost certainly false because
among other things it rules out the existence of measurable cardinals.” More
generally, Hamkins (2014, 25) wrote that this is a common view: “Set theorists
often argue against the axiom of constructability V=L on the basis that it is
restrictive.” But he also wrote that this view is based on an absolute set con-
cept. However, an absolute set concept has limits for those who accept standard
mathematics since ZFC is incompatible with Reinhardt cardinals, so ZFC itself
rules out some large cardinals. Of course, from the point of view of deductive
pluralism absolute attitudes about sets are rejected since they would rule out
those with other views, such as those who would accept ZF+(V=L). Absolute
beliefs about mathematical objects may provide motivation for research, but
do not affect mathematical assertions since they state that within a variety,
correctly using the mathematical and logical assumptions of that variety, an
implication holds: an assumption implies a conclusion. In such a case, the im-
plication holds whether or not the assumption is viewed as an absolute truth.
For example, if ZFC is extended with the axiom of measurable cardinals, then
the rigorous proof that the existence of a measurable cardinal implies that V
6= L holds whether or not one believes in the absolute existence of measurable
cardinals.
Some philosophers assert the need for absolute consistency, as when Resnik
(1997, 142) wrote that “[deductivism] is an unsatisfactory doctrine. Mathe-
maticians want to know that their systems have models; and they want to know
this absolutely, and not just relative to a metaphysical theory.” Recall that
a model is an interpretation of a deductive system in which the axioms hold.
However, Go¨del’s completeness theorem and the Go¨del-Mal’cev theorem imply
that a first order theory using FOPC is consistent if and only if it has a model.
Thus, for such systems Resnik’s assertion is also about consistency. Certainly,
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mathematicians would like to know their system is consistent, but by Go¨del’s
second incompleteness theorem this cannot be proven within the system. So, in
practice mathematicians implicitly assume consistency (except for a few such
as Nelson, mentioned above). In addition, adherents of different varieties of
mathematics have contradictory views about what should be consistent: users
of TG set theory want it to be consistent, while strict constructivists may not
believe that ZFC, much less TG, is consistent. Even Resnik in the pages preced-
ing his assertion quoted above, in a discussion of mathematical practice, wrote
that “[t]he real issue concerns what is true if [the axioms] are true, and in the
course of proving theorems one provides conclusive evidence for such conditional
truths” (Resnik, 1997, 140).
A final example of an objection relying on an absolute concept of truth Hell-
man (1989, 26) wrote that a “decisive objection” to if-thenism is to suppose that
an arithmetic sentence is implied by some assumptions but that the antecedent
is false, e.g., that there is no natural number sequence. Then using FOPC,
in which a false sentence implies all sentences, the assumptions would imply all
sentences. The first problem is that the assignment of absolute truth or falsity to
assumptions about abstracta brings us back to the problematic nature of truth
conditions for abstracta discussed in section 1. Putting this aside, inconsistent
assumptions would lead to problems for any philosophy. In fact, deductivism
can reduce the problems by putting more stress on the foundational assumptions
and by treating them as assumptions rather than as absolute truth. Deductive
pluralism further improves the situation by promoting the awareness that there
is a plurality of varieties with incompatible assumptions. Thus, when consid-
ering absolute views we note that when mathematicians consider philosophical
questions or a new foundation they often do not endorse absolute views; when
mathematicians do have absolute views, these do not affect the mathematics
but reflect personal preferences; and when absolute views are endorsed there is
no agreement (e.g., on large cardinals).
6.2 Objections Based on Applications
There are objections against inclusiveness based on applications. Some of these
view applications as determining the validity of foundations: the existence of
applications of mathematics is used not only to justify mathematics but to al-
low attribution of absolute truth or falsity to mathematical assertions. The
question for this paper is not if some areas of mathematics might be considered
as justified by those interested in particular applications, but whether objec-
tions relying on applications require the rejection of other areas of mathemat-
ics, which would contradict the inclusive criterion of this paper. Some such
objections view mathematics as subordinate to other disciplines, thus regarding
mathematics as a means rather than as an end in itself. Such an attitude is a
personal preference and as such not binding on others. But views subordinating
mathematics to applications also have internal problems. First some examples
will be given with comments specific to them, and then more general remarks.
Resnik (1997, 99) wrote: “On my account, ultimately our evidence for math-
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ematics and mathematical objects is their usefulness in science and practical
life.” Similarly, Azzouni (1994, 84) wrote: “In particular, the truth or falsity
of a particular branch of mathematics or logic turns rather directly on whether
it is applied to the empirical sciences.” However, applicable mathematics can
have contradictory assumptions. For example, both standard mathematics and
BISH can be applied to the empirical sciences, but the former asserts the law
of excluded middle and the existence of the comb function while the latter deny
both. Which then is “true”?
A somewhat broader view was taken by Quine (1986, 400) who allows for
“rounding out” theory beyond applications, such as to uncountable infinities.
He suggests that the axiom V=L affords a convenient cut-off, disallowing in-
accessible cardinals. However, inaccessible cardinals exist in TG set theory as
Grothendieck universes. Also, as mentioned above, the suggestion of V=L as
a cut-off may be in conflict with many set theorists who take absolute views
and consider the axiom V=L as false, or at least too restrictive. So even this
expansive version conflicts with some of the practices of contemporary math-
ematicians, and illustrates the problem of attempting to restrict mathematics
based on applications or even on “rounding out.”
Thus, the advocates of subordinating mathematics to empirical science do
not agree among themselves as to the criteria to be used. Some, as in the quotes
from Resnik and Azzouni, would seem to have rather restrictive criteria while
Quine was more expansive. For all such advocates there is a problem in that
the minimum amount and kind of mathematics needed for an application will
generally be uncertain, both at a particular stage of mathematical development
and over time.
There are arguments against if-thenism based on the idea that the applicabil-
ity of mathematics argues against if-thenism. This paper’s interest is whether
these arguments hold against deductive pluralism. Maddy (1989, 1124–125)
wrote:
But for all this, the argument that seems to have clinched the case
against If-thenism for Russell and Putnam is a version of Frege’s
problem, a problem about applications. Reformulated for the If-
thenist, it becomes: how can the fact that one mathematical sen-
tence follows from another be correctly used to derive true physical
conclusions from true physical premises?
Since this objection is considered important, it will be discussed in some detail,
beginning with the views of Russell and Putnam. Russell (1937, v) wrote in the
preface to the second edition of Principles of Mathematics: “The fundamental
thesis of the following pages, that mathematics and logic are identical, is one
which I have never since seen any reason to modify.” This logicism is Russell’s
version of if-thenism: “PURE Mathematics is the class of all propositions of
the form ‘p implies q’.” What Russell did criticize in the second edition is a
formalism in which the symbols are left uninterpreted. However, as pointed out
above, in deductive pluralism a formalism is accompanied by interpretations,
which provide motivation for the formalism. Thus, Russell’s objections do not
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apply to deductive pluralism. Now we will consider Putnam’s views. Maddy
cites Putnam (1975) in which he wrote (p. 60): “In this paper I argue that
mathematics should be interpreted realistically ... .” This raises the question of
what Putnam meant by realism in mathematics. Later in the article he wrote
(p. 69):
A realist (with respect to a given theory or discourse) holds that
(1) the sentences of that theory or discourse are true or false; and
(2) that what makes them true or false is something external—that
is to say, it is not (in general) our sense data, actual or potential,
or the structure of our minds, or our language, etc. Notice that,
on this formulation, it is possible to be a realist with respect to
mathematical discourse without committing oneself to the existence
of ‘mathematical objects.’ The question of realism, as Kreisel long
ago put it, is the question of the objectivity of mathematics and not
the question of the existence of mathematical objects.
Thus, Putnam discussed two separate issues: the primary concern of realism
which was identified with objectivity, and the existence of mathematical ob-
jects. If-thenism was mentioned later (p 74): “I believe that the position most
people find intuitive...is realism with respect to the physical world and some
kind of nominalism or if-thenism with respect to mathematics”. This, depend-
ing on his concept of if-thenism, may be at odds with his definition of realism
in mathematics quoted above. In any case, deductive pluralism is objective,
as was noted at the end of section 5, and so realistic in Putnam’s formulation,
and it regards the question of the existence of abstract (mathematical) objects
as indeterminate (as discussed at the end of section 4). Thus, the positions of
Russell and Putnam are at most partially in conflict with deductive pluralism.
Now we will consider Maddy’s question above: “how can the fact that one
mathematical sentence follows from another be correctly used to derive true
physical conclusions from true physical premises?” The fact of one statement
following from another shows a correct deduction. Whether this leads to an (ap-
proximately) correct conclusion about a natural system depends on the quality
of the observations, on the quality of the model of the natural system, and on
the mathematics and logic applied to the natural system model. (The term
“natural system model” is used to distinguish a model of a natural system from
models interpreting formal systems.) So, deductive pluralism needs to consider
why there are mathematical theories, either part of or an entire variety, that
can be successfully used in a natural system model.
To sketch the process, given a natural system the researcher picks out cer-
tain features of interest (e.g., the number of items, relations between items,
properties of items, etc.), which may be idealized. These are described in a
natural system model which is developed based on factors such as scientific tra-
ditions and the possibility of using mathematical tools to deduce conclusions.
The natural system model may be initially vague, with interactions between the
intuitions and mathematical theory (existing or specially developed) leading to
a better natural system model. Once this is developed, the observational data
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from the natural system is used to deduce new results, which are then compared
back to the natural system.
Now, how does deductive pluralism fit into this sketch? Pluralism is a natu-
ral fit, supplying many possible mathematical tools that might be used, not only
from standard mathematics but also from other existing varieties of mathemat-
ics (e.g., an algorithmic approach using BISH, or nonstandard mathematics such
as Albeverio et al. (1985)), and the possibility of developing new varieties, such
as those using fuzzy logic or some version of quantum logic. Multiple theories
within standard mathematics have been used for models of physical reality with
incompatible assumptions such as Newtonian physics (flat spacetime) or General
Relativity (curved spacetime), quantum physics (noncommuting observables) or
classical physics (commuting observables), and continuous or discrete systems.
Thus, there is a wide range of mathematical theories, within standard math-
ematics and also other varieties, that can be used in developing the natural
system model.
With respect to deductivism, Resnik (1980, 118) wrote: “Moreover, [de-
ductivism] appears to account nicely for the applicability of mathematics, both
potential and actual; for when one finds a physical structure satisfying the ax-
ioms of a mathematical theory, the application of that theory is immediate.”
However, there is more of an interaction than Resnik suggests between the nat-
ural system and mathematical theory. Often an application starts with the
natural system and then the search for appropriate mathematics. For example,
General Relativity was formulated over several years in the early twentieth cen-
tury interweaving physical intuitions and the mathematical tools of Riemannian
geometry developed in the mid-nineteenth century, and extending these tools
to semi-Riemannian geometry.
Finally, it should also be noted that mathematical deductions sometimes
give conclusions applicable to natural systems because they are designed to do
so, since the mathematical theory and applications to natural systems are de-
veloped together by an individual or by a research community. Some examples
are the development of Newtonian gravitational theory and of the calculus, the
interaction between the development of quantum mechanics and operator the-
ory, and string theory which has had major interactions with new mathematics
such as Calabi-Yau manifolds. As an example of the conjoined development of
natural system models and theory in biology and statistics, Ronald Fisher has
been called a founder of modern statistics and the greatest biologist since Dar-
win by Dawkins (2011): “Not only was he the most original and constructive
of the architects of the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Fisher also was the father of
modern statistics and experimental design.”
In this section we have considered objections to deductive pluralism based on
applications. Some objections subordinate mathematics to other disciplines and
consider it as a means rather than an end in itself. But as discussed above such
objections to inclusiveness are personal choices and also have internal problems.
Other objections seem to implicitly assume that there can be only one variety
of deductivism, or that the assumptions of a variety are unmotivated, neither
of which is the case for deductive pluralism. We have also considered some
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ways mathematics, viewed deductively, can be successfully applied: conjoined
development or selection from a large collection of mathematical theories.
6.3 Objections Based on Mathematical Practice
Although some philosophers such as Papineau consider mathematical practice
as deductivist, there are objections to deductivism based on mathematical prac-
tice, i.e., concerns internal to mathematics. Maddy (1989, 1124) wrote that “we
need to ask what mathematicians were doing before arithmetic was axiomatized.
Was it not mathematics?” It was mathematics, which does not require explicit
axiomatization for a deductivist approach. Historically mathematics had im-
plicit or “evidently true” assumptions about arithmetic or geometry leading to
deductions of new results. Over the course of time these assumptions have been
made more explicit (such as in Euclid’s work) and eventually become formal ax-
iomatic systems (such as in PA), thus clarifying that mathematics studies “what
follows from what.” The need for pluralism, in addition to the clarification of
assumptions provided by axiomatization, has become clear more recently with
the development of incompatible foundations. These developments in math-
ematics should be reflected in the philosophy of mathematics, as they are in
deductive pluralism.
Resnik (1980, 133–36) wrote that “deductivism is a powerful and appeal-
ing philosophy of mathematics,” but he expressed concerns about “loose ends”
related to mathematical practice. The first concern was that the deductivist
“would need to explain why realism is acceptable in nuclear physics but not
in mathematics.” The basic answer to this objection is that physics is about
objects that exist in spacetime, but mathematics is about abstract objects that
do not exist in spacetime. Also, as seen above, Putnam identified realism in
mathematics with objectivity, so in this sense deductive pluralism is realistic.
Another of Resnik’s concerns was that “deductivism may be unable to present
a satisfactory epistemology for deductive reasoning itself.” As has been noted,
different varieties of mathematics have different views about the rules for de-
ductive reasoning (e.g., the acceptance of LEM), so in deductive pluralism the
logic is part of the foundational assumptions.
A final objection along this line is that deductivism is incomplete. Hellman
(1989, 9) wrote that “a straightforward formalist or deductive approach is ruled
out by the Go¨del incompleteness theorems: no consistent formal system can
generate all sentences standardly interpreted as truths ‘about the intended type
of structures(s)’.” We will first expand on this. Consider a first order theory T
using FOPC and containing PA, such as ZFC or PA itself. Since it uses FOPC, if
T is inconsistent then every sentence can be proven. In the rest of this paragraph
we assume that T is consistent and consider interpretations in which the axioms
of the theory hold (i.e., models), including an intended interpretation. By the
first incompleteness theorem there is a sentence G that holds in the intended
interpretation but cannot be proven. However, by the completeness theorem a
sentence can be proven if and only if it holds in all interpretations, so there must
be other interpretations in which G does not hold. Thus, G does not hold in
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general, but only in some interpretations. This is an inherent property of first
order theories using FOPC, independent of any philosophy of mathematics. A
philosophy of mathematics might try to avoid this situation is by ruling out
interpretations other than the preferred one, such as by claiming that truth
in mathematics stands outside formal systems and is otherwise accessible—
considered in section 6.1 on absolute views. However, such an attitude has
sometimes been problematic. Consider an historical analogue. Let Eu be the
axioms of Euclidean geometry without the parallel postulate P . P cannot be
proven from Eu, it holds in the intended interpretation of Eu (the Euclidean
plane), but does not hold in other interpretations, such as hyperbolic geometry,
which have become a focus of modern mathematics. The broader perspective of
deductive pluralism considers varieties with different mathematical and logical
foundations, and does not require a particular interpretation.
7 Other Forms of Pluralism
Various forms of pluralism have been advocated. Rudolf Carnap in The Logical
Syntax of Language (Carnap, 1937, p. xv) wrote:
Let any postulates and any rules of inference be chosen arbitrarily;
then this choice, whatever it may be, will determine what meaning is
to be assigned to the fundamental logical symbols. By this method,
also, the conflict between the divergent points of view on the problem
of the foundations of mathematics disappears ... . The standpoint
which we have suggested—we will call it the Principle of Tolerance
... [thus] before us lies the boundless ocean of unlimited possibilities.
Koellner (2009, p. 98) considered Carnap’s position as too radical and that
“[t]he trouble with Carnap’s entire approach (as I see it) is that the question of
pluralism has been detached from actual developments in mathematics.” Koell-
ner then went on to consider pluralism with respect to additional axioms for
ZFC with the general view that the choices are not arbitrary. (His paper used
the last lyrical phrase of the quotation from Carnap as an epigraph and coda.)
Since both postulates and rules of inference are included in Carnap’s position
it can be viewed as a generalization of deductive pluralism. However, since
deductive pluralism is based on actual mathematical practice, it avoids Koell-
ner’s criticism. In addition, the position advocated here, deductive pluralism,
is somewhat stronger than mere tolerance may suggest, since these varieties
of mathematics should be included in a philosophy of mathematics, not only
tolerated as views external to the philosophy.
Another form of pluralism was advocated by Pedeferri and Friend (2011).
Their proposal was a form of methodological pluralism, allowing “deviant”
proofs “where mathematicians use steps which deviate from the rigorous set
of rules methodologies and axioms agreed to in advance.” Rigorous proofs were
not required to be fully formal: there can be missing steps that in principle can
be filled by relatively routine work in to produce a fully formal proof, which is
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consistent with the usage of this paper. They claimed that there are many de-
viant proofs and gave as the central case study the classification of finite simple
groups. The basis for the claim that a portion of the classification was deviant
was an interview with Serre by Raussen and Skau (2004) in which, according
to Pedeferri and Friend, Serre found that deviant methods were used to over-
come an impasse. This does not correctly represent the issue, which was the
classification of “quasi-thin” groups and which at one point relied on an unpub-
lished manuscript. Those who considered that the classification was complete
at that time viewed the quasi-thin case as having been satisfactorily dealt with
by the manuscript. Serre considered it as a substantial gap. The question was
not one of “deviant” methodology: all the classification was carried out with
standard mathematics and methods. The question was whether the manuscript
was sufficient. As it turned out Serre was correct and the quasi-thin case was
completed at about the time of the Serre interview. Methodological pluralism
was considered as part of a larger program of pluralism in Friend (2013). In
this work Friend advocated pluralism with respect to mathematics, including
inconsistent mathematics. She did not consider foundations containing both
mathematical and logical components. Instead, she suggested the use of some
paraconsistent logic when the varieties of mathematics are compared. No spe-
cific version of the many types of paraconsistent logic was advocated, and no
example of its use was given. As discussed in the introduction there is the
problem that any overarching background logic that is compatible with all the
logics that are and may in the future be used in varieties of mathematics must
be so weak that it is difficult to imagine a useful version. For example, it must
not satisfy the law of excluded middle (rejected by constructive analysis), not
satisfy distribution of conjunction over disjunction (rejected by quantum logic),
etc. When the mathematical and logical foundations are considered together,
as in deductive pluralism, the attempt to find an overarching logic is unnec-
essary. As also pointed out in the introduction, with deductive pluralism the
foundational assumptions can be compared, then within a variety the logic of
that variety can be applied to the mathematical assumptions of that variety,
then the results can be compared. Thus, deduction is primarily within a variety
and only comparison is used between varieties. If deduction is needed outside
the varieties then the general purpose logical tool of FOPC can be used.
There are also advocates for pluralism of two varieties of mathematics or for
pluralistic extensions of an existing variety. Davies (2005) discussed standard
(called “classical” in the paper) and constructive mathematics, with an emphasis
on the justification of constructive mathematics. The paper viewed each of these
two varieties as valid within its own context. Davies (2005, p. 272) wrote that
“[o]ne should simply accept each mathematical theory on its merits, and judge
it according to the non-triviality and interest of the results proved within it.”
This is pluralism with respect to two varieties and the phrase “proved within it”
contains a suggestion of deductivism. Thus, deductive pluralism is compatible
with this view, extending it to general varieties of mathematics and grounding
them in an explicitly deductivist format. An example of pluralism within a
particular area is the approach to set theory developed by Hamkins (2014),
21
which he calls the set-theoretic multiverse, in which there are many distinct
concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe.
This section has considered some related work in the philosophy of math-
ematics and has shown that some approaches are consistent with pluralism or
deductivism. Thus, deductive pluralism as advocated in this paper provides a
systematic approach that encompasses much of this other work.
8 RELATED PHILOSOPHIES
This section considers the relationship between deductive pluralism and some
other philosophies of mathematics. The objective is not to analyze or criticize
them in any detail, which space considerations do not allow, but to only indicate
some of the major points where they intersect with deductive pluralism. One
problem of discussing these is that there are often multiple versions of each
philosophy. Thus, only some features of other philosophies most relevant to
deductive pluralism are considered.
8.1 Fictionalism
Fictionalism is a variety of nominalism since it asserts the non-existence of
abstracta. Balaguer (2013) wrote that the basic tenets of fictionalism are that
(1) mathematical theorems and theories assert the existence of abstracta, (2)
abstracta do not exist, (3) and thus mathematical theorems and theories are
false. Deductive pluralism denies this syllogism since (1) is not accepted as
discussed at the end of section 5: in deductive pluralism what is asserted is not
the absolute existence of abstracta but only statements that a conclusion follows
from assumptions, ultimately from the logical and mathematical foundations;
in brief that mathematics is concerned with “what follows from what.”
This paper also maintains that contrary to (1) a deductivist approach is
consistent with the views of many mathematicians. It is difficult in general to
determine the views of mathematicians about foundational ontological questions
since they almost always write and speak within the context of standard math-
ematics and within that context their assertions are true: the conclusions follow
from the implicit assumptions of that variety. Section 6.1 provided examples of
statements by philosophers and mathematicians (e.g., Mumford, Clarke-Doane,
Maddy, and univalent foundations) that support the contention that mathe-
maticians have a deductivist view when their broader attitudes are sought, not
an absolutist view as asserted in the first assumption of the above syllogism.
Balaguer also discussed another fictionalist slogan that asserts mathematical
statements are “true in the story of mathematics.” This use of the word “story”
asserts an analogy to fiction, and adds unnecessary baggage to nominalism. Lit-
erary fictions deal with events in imaginary spacetimes, e.g., Sherlock Holmes
in London, which is not the case for mathematical objects such as numbers. As
Burgess (2004, p. 35) wrote in his conclusion to a discussion of fictionalism: “I
think that in view of this radical difference between mathematics and novels,
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fables, or other literary genres, the slogan ‘mathematics is a fiction’ not very
appropriate, and the comparison of mathematics to fiction not very apt.” In
any case, the slogan “true in the story of mathematics” can be given an inter-
pretation consistent with deductive pluralism. To do this we consider a “story”
to be a variety of mathematics and the assertion that “a statement is true in
a story of mathematics” becomes “a statement is implied within a variety of
mathematics.”
8.2 Realism
Some philosophies of mathematics have a realistic view of mathematical con-
cepts or entities. Platonism is a strong realism since the entities and concepts are
viewed as eternal, acausal, objectively true, and mind independent. Such views
usually contradict deductive pluralism since they reject incompatible varieties.
However, there are many versions of realism, including the one given by Putnam
which could classify deductive pluralism as realistic since the implications are
objective.
9 Summary
The thesis of this paper is that the criterion of inclusiveness of mathematics plus
the fact of incompatible varieties of mathematics require deductive pluralism.
Section 4 argued in favor of the inclusiveness criterion and then showed that,
given the varieties of incompatible mathematics discussed in section 3, deduc-
tivism is needed within each variety. Section 5 discussed the ontological and
epistemological advantages of deductive pluralism while section 6 discussed and
answered possible objections to deductive pluralism.
Now recall some of the advantages of deductive pluralism. Deductive plu-
ralism is inclusive of mathematical practice since it allows various logical and
mathematical foundations, and is flexible enough to allow for future develop-
ments. It is also consistent with attitudes expressed by many mathematicians
and philosophers of mathematics as is shown in several ways, e.g., by the ex-
pressed view of mathematicians who consider altering the standard foundations
(such as Mumford and those working in univalent foundations) and by the state-
ments of philosophers of mathematics that mathematicians, especially when
pressed, assert that they are concerned with “what follows from what.”
Deductive pluralism also has significant philosophical advantages. Mathe-
matical assertions take the form of implications, ultimately from the founda-
tions. As a consequence the ontological problem of the existence of abstract
objects is eliminated and the problem of epistemology is reduced to the correct-
ness of proofs. Also, mathematical assertions are objectively true in the sense
that mathematicians supporting any variety of mathematics would agree that
within another variety a proof correctly following the logic of that other vari-




This appendix will present in more detail some logical assumptions that dif-
fer between the varieties of mathematics and will discuss some logical results
used in the discussion of these varieties. There is a distinction between syntax
(primarily form) and semantics (related to meaning or truth). Thus, when a
statement is considered as true, it is implicitly meant as true in some interpre-
tation. As an introduction to interpretations of formal systems some examples
of interpretations of logics in terms of sets will also be given.
10.1 Classical Sentential Logic
Most of mathematics uses classical sentential logic and its extension to First
Order Predicate Calculus (FOPC). Propositions are combined using conjunction
∧, disjunction ∨, negation ¬, and other connectives into new propositions. If a
formula has a free variable, e.g., P (x), the universal quantifier ∀ or existential
quantifier ∃ can be used to bind the free variables, e.g., ∀xP (x), producing a
sentence, which by definition has no free variables. The main deductive rule is
modus ponens: if P holds and if P → Q holds then Q holds. In classical logic
implication is defined as “material implication”: P → Q is equivalent to (or
defined as) ¬P holds or Q holds, i.e., ¬P ∨ Q. In this logic a false sentence
implies every sentence, since if P is false, ¬P is true, ¬P ∨ Q holds, and so
P → Q (“explosion” is when a false statement implies every statement). Non-
classical logics often retain modus ponens but do not use material implication.
A second element of classical sentential logic that varies is the Law of Excluded
Middle (LEM): for any sentence P either P holds or ¬P holds and so P ∨ ¬P
always holds.
An interpretation of sentential logic can be given in which a sentence cor-
responds to a set in the Boolean algebra of all subsets of a fixed set U (the
universe). In this interpretation ∨ corresponds to set union ∪, ∧ corresponds
to set intersection ∩, and negation ¬ corresponds to set complement within U .
When discussing interpretations the same letter will be used for a sentence and
its interpretation to simplify notation if there is no danger of confusion.
10.2 Intuitionistic Logic
Intuitionistic logic is used in several varieties of mathematics, including con-
structive mathematics. This logic rejects LEM and consequently rejects the gen-
eral form of proof by contradiction ¬¬P → P . However some particular proofs
by contradiction still go through since by a theorem of Brouwer ¬¬¬P → ¬P
holds in intuitionistic logic.
An interpretation of intuitionistic logic can be given in which a sentence
corresponds to an open set in a fixed topological space U where ∨ and ∧ are
as in the Boolean set interpretation of classical sentential logic (since the union
and intersection of two open sets are both open), but negation corresponds to
the interior of the set complement int(Ac) (since the complement of an open
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set is not generally open) and instead of material implication, where A→ B is
defined as ¬A ∨ B, the intuitionistic interpretation takes the interior: A → B
corresponds to int(Ac ∪ B). Since false corresponds to the empty set and true
corresponds to its complement, U , LEM corresponds to A∪ int(Ac) = U , which
need not hold for all A. Thus LEM fails as desired in this interpretation of
intuitionistic logic.
10.3 Paraconsistent Logic
A paraconsistent logic is one that does not allow the derivation of all sentences in
the case that some sentence and its negative have both been derived. In classical
logic if both P and ¬P are asserted, then any sentence Q can be asserted: from
a contradiction everything follows—ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ). Thus, a
paraconsistent logic must change classical logic to prevent this explosion and
thus triviality (in which all statements can be derived). Various proposals have
been made for paraconsistent logic; one of the most common is relevant logic in
which the conclusion of a deduction must be relevant to the assumption. A way
of attempting to do this is to require both A and B to have a common term as
a precondition for the assertion of A→ B. In ECQ the conclusion need not be
relevant to the assumption, so relevant logic blocks explosion.
An interpretation of paraconsistent logic is closed set logic, a dual to the
interpretation of intuitionistic logic. In this approach a sentence corresponds to a
closed set in a fixed topological space. As with the interpretation of intuitionistic
logic, ∨ corresponds to union and ∧ corresponds to intersection. The interesting
case is again negation. Since in general the complement of a closed set is not
closed, negation corresponds to the closure of the complement Ac. In parallel
with the intuitionistic case A ∧ ¬A corresponds to A ∩ Ac, which need not be
empty (i.e., false).
10.4 Model Theory
A few results are used from FOPC (in which there is only one type of variable),
model theory, and Go¨del’s theorems.
Let L0 be a logic, such as FOPC. A first order language L is an extension
of L0 obtained by adding relation, function, and constant symbols. (These can
all be considered relation symbols, e.g., a constant symbol is a 0-ary relation
symbol.) One of these relation symbols will be the binary equivalence relation of
equality, if it is not considered to be part of the logic. A first order L-theory T is
L together with a collection of sentences, which can be viewed as axioms, in the
language L. (Sometimes the term “theory” is used for both the axioms and all
sentences that can be deduced from them.) If S is a collection of sentences and
a sentence φ can be deduced from S by a finite number of applications of the
rules of deduction (such as modus ponens) then φ is a syntactic (or deductive)
consequence of S, which is written symbolically as S ` φ. A collection S of
sentences is inconsistent if there is some sentence φ such that both φ and ¬φ
can be deduced, i.e., S ` φ and S ` ¬φ.
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Standard model theory uses sets, often not in the context of a specific set
theory. In this approach an interpretation of L is in an L-structure: a set
(or domain) over which the variables range together with assignments sending
constant, relation and function symbols to constants, functions, and relations on
the domain. Thus, we have four elements: a logic, a language, a theory (all three
formal and generally uninterpreted), and an interpretation of the language. The
L-structure interpreting T is assumed to have a consistent way of determining
if a relation is satisfied. The logic, language, and theory are together referred
to as a first order (deductive) system An L-structure M is said to be a model
of an L-theory T , or M satisfies T , if all the sentences of T interpreted in M
are satisfied in M . Symbolically this is written M |= T , read as M models
T . A sentence φ in the language L is defined to be true or semantically valid
(or model-theoretically valid) if it is satisfied in all interpretations, i.e., M |= φ
for all interpretations M . Thus “true” in model theory (and more generally in
mathematics) means true in all models. The models symbol is also used in the
slightly different form S |= φ where S is a collection of sentences in L, φ is a
sentence in L, and S |= φ means that every model of S is also a model of φ.
When S |= φ holds we say that φ is a semantic consequence of S. Thus there
are two versions of consequence: syntactic consequence S ` φ and semantic
consequence S |= φ.
The following results from logic and model theory are used:
• Go¨del’s completeness theorem for first order systems implies that the two
notions of consequence agree: S |= φ if and only if S ` φ.
• Go¨del’s completeness theorem and the Go¨del-Mal’cev theorem imply that
a first order theory is consistent if and only if it has a model. Thus, an
interpretation should not be referred to as a model unless consistency is
proven (or assumed).
• Go¨del’s (first) incompleteness theorem and its extensions imply that in
any consistent formal system containing arithmetic there are statements
in the language of the system such that neither the statement nor its
negative can be proven in that system.
• Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem implies that any consistent first or-
der system containing arithmetic cannot prove its own consistency. Thus,
most results are about relative consistency rather than consistency. Note
that if a system is inconsistent then in FOPC any statement can be proven,
including the statement that the system is consistent.
• The compactness theorem implies that if every finite subset of a first order
system with countably many variables has a model, then the system as a
whole has a model.
• The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem implies that a first order system has a
model with a countably infinite domain if and only if it has a model with
an uncountably infinite domain.
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As an example of these concepts we will consider the first order Dedekind-
Peano axiomatization of the natural numbers (with intended interpretation N =
{0, 1, ...}) and its extension to Dedekind-Peano arithmetic (PA). The formal
language LN of the natural numbers is (S, 0,=) where S is a function symbol
(interpreted as successor), 0 is a constant symbol, and = is the equivalence
relation of equality. The theory PN of the natural numbers adds to the language
LN the Dedekind-Peano axioms:
i. ∀x¬(S(x) = 0)
ii. ∀x∀y(S(x) = S(y)→ x = y)
iii. (φ(0) and ∀x(φ(x)→ φ(S(x))))→ ∀xφ(x)
Axiom (iii) is the axiom schema of induction where, for simplicity, φ is assumed
to be any unary predicate formula. (In general n-ary predicate formulas are
used.) The arithmetic operations can be defined using these three axioms to
give the full set of axioms for the formal first order theory of Dedekind-Peano
arithmetic, PA.
The formal theory PA has the intended interpretation (N, S, 0,=) (where for
simplicity the relations in this interpretation are again given the same names
as the formal relation symbols). By the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem if there
is a countable model for a first order theory, then there are models of all infi-
nite cardinalities. This is an example of the inability of first order theories to
distinguish orders of infinity. By the second incompleteness theorem if PA is
consistent it cannot prove its own consistency, and thus by the completeness
theorem the intended interpretation (N, S, 0,=) cannot be proven to be a model
of PA (without additional assumptions).
Assume that PA is consistent and so has a model M . Then a nonstan-
dard model of PA can be constructed from it by adding a new natural number
constant symbol c to LN giving L
′
N with symbols (S, 0,=, c). (The constant c
can be interpreted as an infinite number.) The theory T ′N is defined to have
the same sentences as PA with the addition of the countable set of sentences
¬(c = 0),¬(c = S(0)),¬(c = S(S(0))), ... . Let F be a finite subtheory of T ′N .
Then F has a model with c interpreted as a suitable element of the domain of
M not corresponding to any element of F . So by the compactness theorem for
first order logic there is a model for the infinite theory T ′N , and thus for PA.
This model is a nonstandard model that is not isomorphic to M .
Since proofs in standard mathematics apply FOPC to the axioms of ZFC, a
(fully formalized) proof holds in all interpretations. This can cause some seeming
contradictions. For example the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem implies that a
first order system such as ZFC has a model (i.e., is consistent) with a countably
infinite domain if and only if it has a model with an uncountably infinite domain.
So, assuming consistency, the real numbers can be defined and proven to be
uncountable in any interpretation. This appears to be a contradiction to the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, but it is resolved by recalling that a set is countable
if and only if there is a one-to-one function from the natural numbers onto the
set. Thus, from the (internal) perspective of an interpretation there may not
exist enough such one-to-one functions so that a set is uncountable, while from
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the (external) perspective of another interpretation such a one-to-one function
exists. Thus, every interpretation “thinks” that it is the intended interpretation.
From a deductive perspective this does not matter since a deduction from the
axioms of ZFC applies to all interpretations.
10.5 Second Order Logic
Some considerations concerning second order logic are needed in this paper. In
second order logic there are two types of variables, first order variables ranging
over the elements of the domain and second order variables ranging over sets of
elements. The second order variables are sometimes considered as properties,
but we will take an extensional approach in which a set corresponds to all
elements having that property. The standard (or canonical) interpretation of
second order logic is to use “all” subsets of a domain, although there is a problem
in deciding what “all” means. The model-theoretic results listed above do not
generally hold for second order logic: second order logic is not complete, since
S |= φ may hold but not S ` φ; the compactness theorem does not hold; and
the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem does not hold.
Quine famously referred to second order logic as “set theory in sheep’s cloth-
ing” (Quine, 1986, p. 66), and Shapiro wrote that “second-order logic, as un-
derstood through standard semantics, is intimately bound up with set theory”,
(Shapiro, 2012, p. 305). Considering the problems of second order logic such
as incompleteness, its close relation to set theory, its use of sets in its model-
theoretic semantics, its relative lack of development compared with FOPC, and
no clear mathematical advantages (e.g., see Vaananen (2012)) mathematicians
have generally stuck with the traditional approach of standard set theory with
FOPC rather than use second order logic.
11 Appendix: Historical Examples
Mathematics has been practiced for thousands of years. Over this period mathe-
maticians have abstracted, generalized, reinterpreted, axiomatized, and formal-
ized past work. This section gives two examples of the trend towards formal-
ization: the natural numbers as formalized by the Dedekind-Peano axioms, and
group theory.
The “naturalness” of the natural numbers was discussed at the beginning of
section 6.1. Explicit definitions of the natural numbers have been given since
early times. For example, Euclid (1908), Book VII, definition 1 states that “a
unit is that by virtue of which each of the things that exist is called one” and
definition 2 states that “[a] number is a multitude composed of units.” The
definition of unit is unclear or circular, and multitude is not defined. Of course,
not all concepts can be defined if infinite regress is to be avoided. Euclid also
uses implicit assumptions, and there have been various proposals on how to fill
in the gaps. When it comes to proof Euclid interprets numbers as geometrical
line segments. For example, proposition 1, in which a condition is given for two
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numbers to be prime to one another, begins “[f]or, the lesser of two unequal
numbers AB, CD . . .”, where these are line segments. Thus, Euclid is an early
example of the use of definitions, interpretations (as line segments), and implicit
assumptions. Newton (1769, p. 2) defined numbers, including rationals and ir-
rationals, by abstracting from ratios: “By number we understand not so much a
multitude of unities, as the abstracted ratio of any quantity, to another quantity
of the same kind, which we take for unity.” By the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury the widely used properties of the natural numbers were axiomatized by the
Dedekind-Peano axioms, and by their extension to Dedekind-Peano Arithmetic,
PA. The applicability of the natural numbers is thus to be expected since PA is
based on the natural practice of cultures with discrete, stable, finite collections
of objects. The finiteness property is a notable difference between many applied
uses of numbers and the axioms of PA which might lead to inconsistency: the in-
ductive axiom produces an infinity, potential or actual, of natural numbers. As
noted in the above discussion of standard mathematics, some mathematicians
have believed that PA is inconsistent due to the inductive axiom.
As another example of the growth of mathematical concepts consider the
group concept. As discussed in Kleiner (1986) the concept developed from a va-
riety of sources: in the eighteenth century Euler studied modular arithmetic and
Lagrange studied permutations of solutions to algebraic equations; in the nine-
teenth century Jordan defined isomorphisms of permutation groups and Cayley
extended the study of groups beyond permutations to other examples, such as
matrices. Although Cayley was ahead of his time in abstracting the concepts
to sets of symbols, group elements were usually considered as transformations
until the twentieth century. The first study of groups without assuming them
to be finite, without making any assumptions as to the nature of their elements,
and formulated as an independent branch of mathematics may have been the
book “Abstract Group Theory” by O. Shmidt in 1916. Thus, analogous to
the axiomatization of the natural numbers the axiomatization of group theory
occurred as the result of a long period of development.
In these and other examples history shows that basic mathematical concepts
can arise over a long period of gradual development, abstraction, generalization,
and eventual axiomatization and formalization. These concepts develop natu-
rally and are not arbitrarily selected variations on existing concepts.
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